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Merleau-Ponty on Human Motility and Libet’s Paradox 
 
by T. Brian Mooney and Damien Norris 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In 1979, neuroscientists Libet, Wright, Feinstein and Pearl introduced the “delay-and-antedating” 
hypothesis/paradox based on the results of an on-going series of experiments dating back to 1964 that 
measured the neural adequacy [brain wave activity] of “conscious sensory experience”. What is 
fascinating about the results of this experiment is the implication, especially when considered in the 
light of Merleau-Ponty’s notions of “intentionality” and the “pre-reflective life of human motility”, 
that the body, and hence not solely the mind, is a thinking thing. The experiments and conclusions of 
Libet et al. have attracted considerable academic attention and have been used in the development of 
psychological theories on automotivism and the adaptive unconscious. Moreover, they have 
engendered a series of important considerations in respect of the question of free will. This paper 
outlines the connections between the findings of Libet et al. and Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as 
presented in the Phenomenology of Perception (1945/1962). It is not our intention to argue that the 
former amounts to new wine in old bottles, but rather to show counterfactually (since we offer no new 
scientific data and assume the conclusions of the experiments) that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology provides 
a theoretical framework which explains the experimental data obtained by Libet et al., and provides 
further speculative confirmation of the work stemming from neuro-physical research and emerging 
theories on the adaptive unconscious. 
 
 
 
In 1979, four neuroscientists Libet, Wright, Feinstein 
and Pearl introduced the “delay-and-antedating” 
hypothesis/paradox based on the results of an on-
going series of experiments dating back to 1964 that 
measured the neural adequacy [brain wave activity] of 
“conscious sensory experience” (Libet, 1964, 1973, 
1993; Libet, Alberts, Wright, Dellatre, et al., 1964; 
Libet, Alberts, Wright, & Feinstein, 1967, 1972; 
Libet, Alberts, Wright, Lewis, & Feinstein, 1975; 
Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; Libet, Pearl, et 
al., 1991; Libet, Wright, Feinstein, & Pearl, 1979). 
What is fascinating about the results of this 
experiment is the implication, especially when 
considered in the light of Merleau-Ponty’s notions of 
“intentionality” and the “pre-reflective life of human 
motility”, that the body, and not solely the mind, is a 
thinking thing. The experiments and conclusions of 
Libet et al. have attracted considerable academic 
attention and have been used in the development of 
psychological theories on automotivism and the 
adaptive unconscious (Wilson, 2002). Moreover, they 
have engendered a series of important considerations 
in respect of the question of free will (Brasil-Neto et 
al., 1992; Dennett, 1991; Dennett & Kinsbourne, 
1992; Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
This paper will outline the connections between the 
findings of Libet et al. and Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
as presented in the Phenomenology of Perception 
(1945/1962). It is not our intention to argue that the 
former amounts to new wine in old bottles, but rather 
to show counterfactually (since we offer no new 
scientific data and assume the conclusions of the 
experiments even though there have been numerous 
criticisms of the latter [Churchland, 1991a, 1991b; 
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Dennett, 1991]) that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
provides a theoretical framework which explains the 
experimental data, and provides further speculative 
confirmation of the work stemming from neuro-
physical research and emerging theories on the 
adaptive unconscious. 
 
Libet’s Experiment 
 
In their experiment, Libet et al. attempted to measure 
cognitive responses to physical stimuli. The subject’s 
forearm was pricked with an instrument while a 
device monitored the neural adequacy [brain wave 
activity] of the neural cortex area in the brain 
corresponding to the area of stimulation. Subjects 
were asked to respond to the stimulation by pressing a 
button as soon as they became aware of the stimulus.  
 
Working within the traditional paradigm of linear 
causality one would expect the following sequence: 
(a) stimulation to the forearm; (b) brain wave activity 
[or neural adequacy measurement]; (c) the subject’s 
physical response of pressing the button. However, 
this sequence did not occur. Instead, what actually 
occurred was: (a) stimulation to the forearm; (c) the 
subject’s physical response of pressing the button; 
and, half a second after the subject’s physical 
response, (b) brain wave activity or neural adequacy 
measurement. Even more puzzling is the fact that the 
subject claimed to be aware of the stimulation at the 
moment of response, despite the absence of brain 
wave activity [neural adequacy] normally associated 
with conscious awareness of action.  
 
The result of this experiment presents an interesting 
paradox. How can a subject be aware of a sensation  - 
that is, be conscious of it - if the subject’s brain has 
not registered that “awareness”?  
 
One way of resolving Libet’s paradox would be to 
bite the bullet and say that the experiment is a case of 
backward causation - the activity in the subject’s 
brain was the cause of her preceding response. This is 
the line followed up by Libet. However, there is a less 
heroic explanation of the paradoxical sequence - that 
the subject’s body reacted to the stimulus prior to the 
activity of her mind. As it stands, this explanation 
seems unsatisfactory because it seems to leave out the 
causal role of the subject’s cognition. But this lacuna 
is filled once we say that the body, and not solely the 
mind, is a thinking thing. This completed explanation 
is implicit in Merleau-Ponty’s remark that “it is not 
[reflective] consciousness which touches or feels, but 
the hand, and the hand is, as Kant says, ‘an outer 
brain of man’” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 316). 
The complete explanation is in turn delivered by 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of intentionality in terms of 
the “pre-reflective life of human motility”, in which 
one can begin to see a possible non-reductionist 
framework for the interpretation of the experimental 
data obtained by Libet et al.. We will not defend this 
account here. Instead, it will be presented as one that 
is  coherent and not implausible. We now turn to this. 
  
Intentionality as Intentional Arc 
 
Many phenomenologists seek to understand the 
‘contact’ with the ‘primitive fact’ of immediate 
experience. For Merleau-Ponty, this ‘contact’ is not 
made solely by mind, but by the union of mind and 
body: that is, the body-subject or an embodied 
consciousness. Indeed, in Merleau-Ponty’s (1947/ 
1967) view, if one seeks the ‘truth’ of the world, one 
must begin with the body-subject and the sensuous 
acts of perception, for “the experience of perception is 
our presence at the moment when things, truth, values 
are constituted for us; …perception [according to 
Merleau-Ponty] is a nascent logos.” 
  
For Merleau-Ponty, the notion of intentionality as 
“consciousness of…” suggests that consciousness 
must already possess that which it seeks - otherwise it 
would not be able to locate it.1 He does not see this as 
a paradox. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty declares that 
consciousness possesses that unique ability of 
“placing before” itself exactly what it intends to find. 
This notion of “placing before”, when used in 
Merleau-Ponty’s extended notion of intentionality as 
intentional arc, suggests a previous transaction that 
underlies the intentional thread.  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s insight is that knowledge itself is not 
a “primitive” or primary link with “reality”, because 
“knowledge of…” or “consciousness of…” 
presupposes a previous exchange from which one’s 
knowledge of a thing has been derived. Hence 
intentionality, defined as “consciousness of…”, is not 
primary in a fundamental sense. Rather, it suggests an 
intimate encounter with a reality of which one’s 
reflective knowledge is but a second order 
representation of the immediate experience it has 
been derived from - an exchange that Merleau-Ponty 
expresses with his description of intentionality as 
“intentional arc”. 
 
                                                 
1 Meno’s paradox; i.e. the Socratic problem: “How will you 
set about looking for that thing, the nature of which is 
totally unknown to you? Which, among the things you do 
not know, is the one which you propose to look for? And if 
by chance you should stumble upon it, how will you know 
that it is indeed that thing, since you are in ignorance of it?” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 371)  
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Far from skirting the obvious paradox of asserting a 
feature of consciousness that places before itself what 
it intends to find, Merleau-Ponty embraces it and 
attempts to turn it into a positive component of his 
philosophy. “Reflective consciousness”, being of the 
order of “I think…”, is intentionally directed towards 
the “object”. “Reflective consciousness” has the 
object arrayed before consciousness and is able to 
seek it out by virtue of the “intentional arc”: that is, 
that feature of consciousness that subtends reflective 
consciousness and reaches ahead of itself, polarising 
thought and presenting consciousness with a 
meaningful something to see. It is as if we are 
ontologically hard-wired to know the world as 
“seeable”, graspable, and so forth, prior to the 
exercise of reflective consciousness. Finally, within 
the core of this intentional arc exists an inter-
participatory nexus of the immediately given 
dimensions of one’s being that is comprised of key 
elements including sensation, motility [structure of 
human movement], sexuality, and language.2 And it is 
the combination of these elements, all of which inter-
relate and inform one another, that is responsible for 
generating a ‘world of thought’ and a world of 
meaning.  
 
For Merleau-Ponty, the intentional arc is that 
dimension of embodied-consciousness that does not 
consciously ‘weigh up’ the given of a situation before 
acting. Instead, it is the manner in which one becomes 
“involved in the world through stable organs and pre-
established circuits” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 
87); the development, thus, of a “pre-patterned 
existence” that acts on the subject’s behalf, such that 
one acquires a kind of “knowledge” that sinks behind 
reflective consciousness, and is attended to by the 
intentional arc. It is this feature of consciousness that 
places before consciousness what is to be seen, and 
subsequently withdraws in order to free (Merleau-
Ponty, ibid.)3 consciousness to be “consciousness 
of…”.4 Motility is one way in which the body 
                                                 
2 While it is important to note that these categories are not 
exhaustive, the specific dimensions of these particular 
components of the intentional arc are elaborated in detail in 
Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945/ 
1962), i.e., Sensation, pp. 203-242; Motility, pp. 73-90, 98-
153; Sexuality, pp. 154-173;  Language, pp. 174-202. 
 
3 “Thus it is by giving up part of his spontaneity, by 
becoming involved in the world through stable organs and 
pre-established circuits that man can acquire the mental and 
practical space which will theoretically free him from his 
environment and allow him to see it.” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/1962, p. 87)  
 
4 As Merleau-Ponty says, “… beneath intelligence as 
beneath perception [traditional sense], we discover a more 
fundamental function … the life of consciousness - 
establishes a set of patterned responses that make 
decisions on the subject’s behalf. We will now take a 
closer look at this. 
 
Human Motility and Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of 
Habit  
 
Merleau-Ponty notes that, when an insect’s leg is 
removed, the function of the lost limb is “replaced” 
by an equivalent limb. But, when the insect’s leg is 
tied up, no substitution is made and the insect 
continues to stumble on as if it were in full possession 
of “all its powers” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 78). 
From this observation, Merleau-Ponty reasons that the 
insect, with all its limbs, “belongs” to a certain kind 
of “world”, not via an “objective consciousness” but 
via a “practical significance” towards the “self-
evident demands of the task” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/1962, p. 77). In other words, the undamaged 
insect is a priori predisposed towards the world 
according to the determinants of its bodily structure 
and motile capacity. The “world”, and the insect’s 
actions within it, are said to be given by the 
determinants of the insect’s motile structure and the 
unique geographical structure of the world (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 79). Hence, when the leg is lost, 
the bodily structure of the insect is fundamentally 
altered and as such the insect ‘replaces’ the 
movement. But, when the insect’s leg is tied up, the 
insect maintains what Merleau-Ponty calls its 
particular being-in-the-world5 and continues to 
operate within this “world” unaware of the 
encumbrance (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 77). 
Here, the term being-in-the-world is not one that 
designates a world objectively appropriated or 
possessed; rather, it designates the total manner of 
pre-reflectively being in the world. This mode of 
being is one’s foundational ‘gearing’ towards the 
world that delimits all possible motor options and 
subsequently the range of all possible actions.6 
                                                                          
cognitive life, the life of desire or perceptual life - is 
subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects around 
about us our past, our future, our human setting, our 
physical, ideological and moral situation, or rather which 
results in our being situated in all these respects. It is this 
intentional arc which brings about the unity of the senses, of 
intelligence, of sensibility and motility.” 
 
5 The insect’s particular existential and immediately lived 
orientation within a given situation. 
 
6 It is important to note that the insect’s particular bodily 
structure does not entirely determine the insect’s 
movements. A certain amount of ‘free-play’ is discerned. 
For example, when a spider spins a web it does so 
according to a particular ‘style’ or ‘method’. However, the 
web, spun on a daily basis, is constructed on different 
surfaces and during differing wind and climatic conditions, 
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In this example, the insect has its body, or is its body, 
and continues to “stumble on” when its leg is tied 
because it retains its “normal” orientation towards the 
world. This is not to say that the insect has this 
“orientation” by virtue of a reflective act. Rather, it is 
suggested that the insect has an immediate “bodily 
recognition” of its motile structure. Thus, the nature 
of the reflex is that it “predelineates a certain milieu 
of possible behaviour, before any ‘stimulation’ 
whatsoever” (Zaner, 1964).   
 
Merleau-Ponty makes the same point with human 
examples. He cites patients who, despite having lost 
their vision, maintain their “visual world” and “can be 
seen colliding with objects everywhere” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 80). Conversely, those whose 
vision is slowly degenerating become premature 
invalids by resigning from their habitual ways of life 
and “breaking their vital contact with the world 
before losing sensory contact with it” (Merleau-
Ponty, ibid.). In both cases, it can be seen that a 
previous orientation or being-to-the-world is either 
retained or abandoned in a way that is at odds with 
reality. The blind retain their visual orientation 
despite its unreality. Those slowly going blind 
abandon it despite its reality.7 Merleau-Ponty 
concludes that there is a pre-personal, pre-reflective 
world underlying reflective consciousness that gives 
one’s world a certain constancy, thus allowing the 
agent to operate without having to deliberate over 
every movement - a process that is deemed pre-
reflective or pre-objective precisely because these 
operations are not vouchsafed by a reflective 
consciousness before being enacted. It is that feature 
of one’s existence - one’s being-in-the-world - which 
“buries … (one’s) perceptual and practical intentions 
in objects which ultimately appear prior” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 82) to consciousness, and by 
virtue of which consciousness is able to see them or 
recognise them as such. It is also a mysterious 
                                                                          
the uniqueness of which is allocated for in the design.  
Therefore, within this ‘patterned’ or ‘instinctual’ act a 
combination of rigidity and spontaneity is allowed. 
 
7 “There is, then, a certain constancy in our ‘world’, 
relatively independent of stimuli, which refuses to allow 
us to treat being-in-the-world as a collection of reflexes  -  a 
certain energy in the pulsation of existence, relatively 
independent of our voluntary thoughts, which prevents us 
from treating it as an act of consciousness. It is because it is 
a pre-objective view that being-in-the-world can be 
distinguished from every third person process, from every 
modality of the res extensa, as from every cogitatio, from 
every first person form of knowledge - and that it can effect 
the union of the ‘psychic’ and the ‘physiological.” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 80; emphasis added) 
 
process, a kind of energy or “pulsation of existence” 
which knows better than reflective consciousness 
what can be achieved: “the scope of our life”. 
 
One application of this theory is used by Merleau-
Ponty to understand patients with phantom limbs8 and 
anosognosia9. In the case of anosognosia, the patient 
perceives the absence of a limb that is physically 
present. In the case of phantom limbs, the patient 
perceives the presence of a limb that is physically 
absent. Given these conditions, the question is asked, 
“How can a suitable explanation be given that 
describes a condition whereby the patient cognitively 
affirms a reality that is not the case?” In other words, 
how does one explain the absence of a presence 
[anosognosia] on the one hand, and the presence of an 
absence [phantom limb] on the other? 
 
Given that, in the case of a phantom limb, there is in 
reality no arm, for instance, it is difficult to see how 
an appeal to purely empirical ‘physiological facts’ can 
alone explain the condition without an appeal to 
psychological considerations too. Conversely, it is 
equally difficult to see how an appeal to purely 
intellectual ‘psychic facts’ will suffice when “no 
psychological explanation can overlook the fact that 
the severance of the nerves to the brain abolishes the 
phantom limb” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 77). 
As for anosognosia, it is said that the patient refers to 
the arm as “a long, cold snake” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/ 1962, p. 76), a response which rules out both 
cognitive ignorance and bodily anaesthesia. Clearly, 
then, “the phantom limb is not the mere outcome of 
objective causality; no more is it a cogitation” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 77). Therefore, to 
adequately describe anosognosia and phantom limbs, 
Merleau-Ponty seeks a hybrid theory: a link between 
the physiological and the psychic. The difficulty of 
finding the common-ground between something that 
exists in space [physiological facts] and that which 
exists nowhere [psychic facts] is freely admitted; yet 
it is argued that this union can be forged provided that 
the existence of a middle term can be demonstrated 
(Merleau-Ponty, ibid.). 
 
The middle term is supplied to Merleau-Ponty by the 
notions of habit-body and the intentional arc. The 
habit-body suggests that an agent is in full possession 
of his or her body and does not need to discover the 
                                                 
8 The failure or refusal to acknowledge the absence or 
mutilation of a limb; for example, a patient who affirms the 
existence of a limb that he or she does not possess. 
 
9 Anosognosia is a severe mental condition involving a 
failure to acknowledge a disease or disability. Although it 
has a much wider field of application, here we concentrate 
on Merleau-Ponty’s examples. 
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appropriate bodily part in order to instigate an action, 
by virtue of a pre-established motor pattern that is 
already charged with significance. For example, when 
a baby seeks out an object, she watches the object and 
not her hand. Here, the ‘hand’ is that which the baby 
is in intimate possession of and does not have to 
consciously find before it can be used. Importantly, 
the baby’s “movement is not thought about 
movement” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 137), and 
the fact that the baby unequivocally reaches out 
suggests that the object sought has already been 
invested with meaning. In other words, the object 
sought is already understood as a thing-to-be-touched, 
a-thing-that-can-be-grasped, and the hand is already 
understood as that-which-can-grasp. This knowledge 
has thus withdrawn from reflective consciousness into 
the domain of the intentional arc. This is why 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that “movement … is basic 
intentionality, and consciousness is not in the first 
instance an ‘I think that’ but an ‘I can’” (ibid.). More 
profoundly, he declares that “motility, in its pure 
state, possesses the basic power of giving a meaning 
(Sinngebung)”, asserting further that “(m)otility is the 
primary sphere in which initially all significance is 
engendered” (ibid., p. 142). 
 
Merleau-Ponty is now able to explain phantom limbs 
and anosognosia: an armless patient continues to 
reach for a glass because she retains her being-in-the-
world, a world which includes reachable objects. As 
such, the patient continues to reach for a glass with an 
arm that is not there or to stand upon a limb that is 
absent. The patient’s phantom limb is not simply 
imaginary; nor is it a psychic memory in the sense 
that it is the repressed experience of an actual limb  -  
“a former present that cannot decide to recede into the 
past” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 85); nor is it 
simply the vague recollection of a previous moment. 
Instead, the phantom limb is a “former present” that is 
prevented from receding by an established 
physiological pre-patterned motor-system that 
operates below the level of cognitive reflection within 
the motor dimension of one’s intentional arc. More 
importantly, as this arc possesses the ability to cast 
before consciousness what consciousness is to be of, 
there appears to be no easy way that the phantom 
limb patient can discover his or her condition. Thus, 
any treatment that ignores the physiological in favour 
of the psychic, or the psychic in favour of the 
physiological, will fail to discover the human 
significance of the actual event and ultimately fail to 
adequately treat the patient. Therefore, it is only by 
rediscovering the subject’s particular being-in-the-
world - the existential determinants of a lived-
through-physical-psychic-life - that the conditions can 
be understood and successfully treated.     
 
These examples of morbid motility highlight the 
manner in which the body establishes motor patterns 
which overlay upon the world a motor significance. In 
this sense, one does not simply have a body, but one 
is one’s body. In Merleau-Ponty’s words, “I am not in 
front of my body, I am in it, or rather I am it” (1945/ 
1962, p. 150). That is, a person is not simply an 
assemblage of juxtaposed organs, but a being who has 
an undivided acquisition of itself.10  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s example of the blind man and his 
cane is particularly useful in understanding habitual 
movement. The blind man’s repeated use of the cane 
results in the cane becoming “incorporated” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 139) into the man’s 
body-image (ibid. p. 141). The cane becomes “a 
bodily auxiliary, an extension of the bodily synthesis” 
(ibid., p. 153), and the man’s practical use of the cane 
becomes a habitual pattern subsumed as a motor 
intentionality. From repeated practice, the habit of 
using the cane becomes increasingly more refined 
until eventually there is no longer a need for the man 
to interpret the pressures of the cane on his skin, nor 
to objectively measure the length of the cane in order 
to gauge distances. Indeed, at this stage there is no 
need to objectively interpret any data whatsoever, in 
that all this is performed for him by a habitual 
function that “relieves” him of the necessity of doing 
so (ibid., p. 152).   
 
In Merleau-Ponty’s terminology, the world projected 
around the man, and the particular habitual patterns 
acquired, are the sediment left over from mental 
processes that have become immediately-given pre-
patterned actions (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 130). 
However, it must be acknowledged that these 
sediments are far from static. Merleau-Ponty argues 
that they remain so long as one retains in one’s hands 
the relevant intentions corresponding to a given 
situation. These pre-reflective movements - the 
                                                 
10 According to Merleau-Ponty, within the Cartesian 
tradition there are but two interpretations of the term ‘exist’: 
either “one exists as a thing or else one exists as a 
consciousness” (1945/1962, p. 198). Our exploration of the 
existential manner in which the body is lived suggests that 
this distinction is not clear-cut. To make this explicit, when 
reflection is turned upon one’s own body, the object [in-
itself] and the subject [for-itself] are found to co-exist in a 
kind of mutual reversibility or circularity. That is, when a 
subject reaches out to touch an object with one hand, while 
the other hand grasps the wrist of the hand reaching, the 
body that ‘reaches’ becomes the body ‘touched’: “The body 
turns back on itself and takes itself for its own object” 
(Madison, 1981). While it must be said that the body can 
never be both subject and object at the same time, the body-
subject is shown as a being with two ‘sides’ whose 
relationship is circular. Thus the body-subject is seen as 
being both thing and consciousness, object and subject. 
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tapping of the cane - extend into the world, but they 
are sustained by a reflective consciousness that 
reaffirms the act: “they offer me a meaning, but I give 
it back” (ibid., p.130). One’s sediment of habitual 
pre-patterned movements determines an outline and 
subsequently retreats (ibid., p. 152). Furthermore, the 
body-image of the blind man is not confined to the 
outline of his skin. That is, the traditional border 
between the cane [a traditional object] and the man 
[traditional subject] is ‘blurred’ by virtue of the fact 
that the cane has become an “extension of his bodily 
synthesis” (ibid., p. 152).  
 
Conclusion  
 
We are now in a position to return to Libet’s paradox 
- that there seems to be a case of backward causation - 
and to our original question: How can a subject be 
aware of a sensation - that is, be conscious of it - if 
the subject’s brain has not registered that 
“awareness”?  In this discussion of the intentional arc 
and the structure of human motility - particularly 
habitual motor patterning  -  it can be clearly seen that 
subjects sustain around them “a system of meanings 
whose reciprocities, relationships and involvements 
need not be made explicit in order to be exploited” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 129). Furthermore, 
they do not require the intervention of reflective 
consciousness for their enactment. However, the 
question to be asked is, “If habit is neither a form of 
knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it?” 
One reply offered by Merleau-Ponty is that “It is 
knowledge of the hands, which is forthcoming only 
when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated 
in detachment from that effort” (ibid., p. 144). By this 
Merleau-Ponty is not suggesting that the kind of 
knowledge acquired by the habitual body is 
knowledge in the traditional sense. Habitual 
knowledge is not knowledge objectively arrayed 
before reflective consciousness. What is being 
suggested is that the phenomenon of habit forces 
traditional notions of knowledge and understanding to 
be revised (ibid., p. 144).  
 
This investigation of the lived-experience of human 
movement reveals a body whose motor actions are - 
for the most part - initiated from a pre-reflective 
realm informed by immediate experience. In addition, 
the exploration of the formation of patterned motor 
habit suggests that whatever form of pre-personal 
knowledge Merleau-Ponty is arguing for in his 
Phenomenology of Perception, it is arguably both 
“original and perhaps primary” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/ 1962, p. 140): that is, habitual knowledge is 
original in the sense that it is irreducible and 
inaccessible to intellectual analysis (Hammond, 
Howarth, & Keat, 1991, p. 179). As we have set out 
to demonstrate, at the level of habitual or pre-
reflective movement there is no objective body. The 
traditional object is not an accurate phenomenal 
representation of the thing, so long as the subject is 
conceived of as a detached observer. Indeed, the 
significance and meaning of the thing is now seen as 
the outcome of a lived-through relationship between 
thing, self and world wherein the ‘seam’ between 
subject and object has been significantly effaced.11  
 
Merleau-Ponty’s positing of the intentional arc, of 
which motility is one component, proceeds from a 
nexus of inter-related and inter-participatory 
meaning-giving dimensions. It is that aspect of one’s 
lived-through experience that allows reflective 
consciousness to be “consciousness of…”. Therefore, 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of this mode of pre-personal 
knowing is perhaps primary because, unlike reflective 
consciousness, immediately lived bodily experience 
and the realm of the primitive fact (Hammond, 
Howarth, & Keat, 1991, p. 179) are synonymous. 
That is, one’s immediate presence to is an intimate 
communion with the world “at the moment when 
things, truth, values are constituted for us” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1947/1967, p. 41). Consequently, because 
motility is conceived of as being essentially a 
meaning giving act (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 
142), it is arguable that the specific determinants of 
one’s motile structure fundamentally influence the 
meaning invested in objects and indeed the very 
significance of the world.   
 
If it is true that “consciousness is being-towards-the-
thing though the intermediary of the body” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 138), and since it appears that 
one’s motile structure is a “basic [form of] 
intentionality”, then arguably one’s body is 
implicated (along with the other components of the 
intentional arc) in the engendering of meaning and 
significance. Bodily motility, in its pre-reflective 
reaching out towards an object, is an act subtended by 
an intentional thread already charged with meaning 
and significance. As such, decisions like ‘it is a 
graspable thing’, ‘it is a thing ‘for-me’’, ‘it can be 
reached from here’, and ‘it is something ‘I’ want’,12 
are all meaningful gestures or actions that occur 
without the need of a reflectively conscious 
                                                 
11 The reference here is to Montaigne’s confession in “On 
Friendship” (1588/1958) regarding the nature of the 
friendship between himself and tienne de la Boétie. 
 
12 The ‘I’ here refers to the pre-reflective ‘I’ that determines 
on behalf of the reflective ‘I’ what the thing wanted is. 
Merleau-Ponty would call this the tacit cogito, as opposed 
to the spoken cogito. For a detailed account of this, see 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, pp. 369-409. 
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composer. For these reasons, the body is clearly not 
merely the “handmaid of consciousness” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 139), obediently obeying the 
dictates of the intellectualist’s mind. And, finally, 
since the body is an active agent investing things, 
others and the world with vital value, and not simply 
an inert or passive receptor, as traditional empiricism 
once led us to believe, it appears that one can 
reasonably affirm Libet’s speculation and conclude 
that it is possible that it was an embodied 
consciousness that responded to the stimuli without 
the aid of reflective consciousness and the associated 
presence of neural adequacy readings, precisely 
because the body, and not solely the mind, is a 
thinking thing. Moreover, such an analysis has the 
benefits of explaining Libet’s data without recourse to 
the highly contentious notion of backward causation, 
and of providing illuminating frameworks for 
understanding theories of the “adaptive unconscious” 
and the “extended mind” (Clark, 2002; Clark & 
Dennett, 1998; Wilson, 2002). Indeed, we may be 
coming to a point where neuroscience can provide an 
alternative language to articulate Merleau-Ponty’s 
ontological speculations. 
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